Listar por autor "Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel"
Mostrando ítems 1-13 de 13
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A duopoly game under uncertainty about product differentiation: A separating or pooling equilibrium?
Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel
(2016-11-14)
This article analyses price competition in a two-period duopoly model in which only one firm knows the degree of substitutability between products. Using a Hotelling model, we analyse the informed firm´s incentive to reveal ... -
Discriminación de precios en el mercado hotelero español
(2014-09-03) -
Educational signaling under different education systems.
Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel (2024)
We consider a two-period signaling model in which an informed worker has to decide whether she invests in education or participates in the labor market in the first period. When the rate at which the cost of education ... -
Entry deterrence when the potential entrant is your competitor in a different market
Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel (Wiley Online Library, 2021)
In this article, we present a two-period model in which one firm operates in two markets: a monopoly and a duopoly. Assuming that this firm has private information on the cross-price elasticity of demand between the products ... -
Gender of supervisors. Does it matter?
Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel (2014-09-23)
This study analysed the effect on the wage gap of women´s access to supervisory jobs within each establishment in the Spanish labour market. Previous empirical studies have found that the promotion of women has a positive ... -
Gender of workers´ supervisors. Does it matter?
Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel (2014-12-16)
This study analysed the effect on the wage gap of women´s access to supervisory jobs within each establishment in the Spanish labour market. Previous empirical studies have found that the promotion of women has a positive ... -
Interaction between Labor Market Conditions and Educational Investment.
Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel (2023)
We consider a two-period model in which an informed worker may invest in education in the first period, in which case she will not participate in the labor market in that period, but her diploma will allow her to signal a ... -
Learning through experimentation in an oligopoly market with asymmetric information
Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel (Wiley Online Library, 2019)
Unlike previous literature, in which firms compete in the market with the same information, this article analyses a two-period duopoly game in which only one firm is completely informed about the market conditions, whereas ... -
Out-of-school use of time and its association with gender differences in educational outcomes.
López-Agudo, Luis Alejandro; Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel (Springer Nature, 2020)
Recent gender literature has highlighted that boys and girls devote their out-of-school time in dissimilar ways, which may differentially influence their academic achievement. Furthermore, this literature indicates that ... -
Pricing policies in a market with asymmetric information and non-bayesian firms.
Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel (Central University of Finance and Economics, 2019)
This article analyses price competition in a two-period duopoly model in which only one firm is aware of the degree of substitutability between products. Using a Hotelling´s model, we analyse the informed firm´s incentive ... -
Selecting a pooling equilibrium in a signaling game with a bounded set of signals
Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel (2019-07-10)
In this paper, we study a general class of monotone signaling games, in which the support of the signal is limited or the cost of the signal is sufficiently low and as a result, there are multiple pooling equilibria. In ... -
Signaling games with a highly efective signal
Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel (2024-09-04)
We study a class of signaling games in which one of the signals induces the receiver to take an action that provides the sender with the highest utility. This class of games has multiple pooling equilibria, but the equilibrium ... -
Using Educational Investment as a Screening and Signaling Device in the Labor Market
Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel (2023)
In the classical Spence´s model, workers have private information on their productivity and they use educational investment in order to signal their productive skills to an uninformed employer. Differently, we consider a ...